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A paper-based compliance program does not exempt an ASFL

Dominican Republic: What does current regulation require from non-profit associations?, what documentation must be built?, and what must remain operational to be able to prove it?

By MSc. Alex Siles Loaiza - CEO at Snap Compliance 16 Oct 2026

TL;DR

Under Dominican Law 74-2025, a non-profit association (ASFL) can face criminal liability if an omission of control or supervision made an offence possible—even without Board knowledge. A paper-based compliance program does not satisfy this standard because the law requires a model that is suitable, verified, auditable and continuously supervised. Law 155-17 (AML/CFT) and Law 122-05 (ASFL regime) apply simultaneously, meaning a single international donation triggers obligations before three different supervisors. The exemption from criminal liability is not declared; it is proven with dated, unalterable records showing that controls actually operated.

For years, non-profit associations (ASFL) occupied a "comfortable" place in the Dominican Republic's regulatory map: supervised in accounting matters, required in tax matters, and practically invisible to criminal and anti-money laundering scrutiny. That place no longer exists.


In the Dominican Republic, Law 74-2025, which establishes the new Criminal Code, makes the legal entity—and an association is one—criminally liable for acts committed in its name or on its account, for its direct or indirect benefit, by its administrators, directors, members or employees. The part worth reading twice is the last one: it is sufficient that the fact was made possible by an omission of control or supervision. The Board does not need to have known anything.


This is not a Dominican singularity. FATF Recommendation 8 identifies non-profit organizations as a sector vulnerable to misuse, and regional frameworks are moving in the same direction. If your organization channels donations, international cooperation or third-party capital, the question is no longer whether it applies to you, but what you can prove the day you are asked.

Three different laws, one single substantive obligation

An ASFL that moves third-party money does not choose which rule applies to it. By its legal status and by its operation, all of them apply at the same time.

Regulation

What it requires

Answerable to

If non-compliant

Law 74-2025 · Criminal Code

Adopt and implement an organization, prevention and compliance management model, before the fact occurs

Criminal jurisdiction

Criminal liability of the association

Law 155-17 · AML/CFT

Prevention program with risk-based approach, due diligence, beneficial owner, compliance officer and suspicious transaction reporting

Financial Analysis Unit

Administrative sanction and banking exclusion

Law 122-05 · ASFL Regime

Member registry, transparency of donation origin and destination, audited financial statements

CASFL and DGII

Loss of status and exemption

A single well-constructed file can satisfy all three supervisors. Three separate files guarantee that none is complete.


There is a point where the regulations intersect and is often overlooked: an international donation activates all three at once. Before CASFL and DGII, you must prove the transparency of the donor and the destination of the fund. Before the UAF, you must prove the legitimacy of the origin and the absence of layering. It is the same fact, but they are two different questions, and the accounting answer does not answer the second one.

The three levels of a program, and why the second one is not enough

The three levels of a compliance program: documentary, what almost everyone has; operational, what the law requires; and evidentiary, what must be builtAlmost all the organizations we review are on the same rung.


The criminal regulation does not ask for a document: it asks for a model that is suitable, verified, auditable and with continuous supervision. All four words matter, and three of them are not fulfilled with an approved manual. They are only fulfilled by operating and leaving a trail.


In other words: the exemption is not declared, it is proven. And it is proven with dated records that the control was executed, not with the manual that says it should have been executed.

Where the real risk lies for an ASFL that channels capital

The most common mistake when building a program is starting from a generic risk catalog. The regulation asks for exactly the opposite: a proprietary risk-based approach. In an investment network, a foundation or an association that administers cooperation, exposure is concentrated in four specific points.


The four risk vectors of an ASFL that channels capital: collection of fees, evaluation of third parties, high-net-worth members and politically exposed persons, and international donationsThe third is the only critical one, and the reason is that it combines regulatory, criminal and reputational consequence in the same fact. It is also the one that least tolerates a one-time verification: the member who entered clean in January and was listed in August is, by definition, the case that no intake review detects.

The 40 instruments we deliver (Technology + Documentary Library + Training)

A complete program for an ASFL is organized in three layers that support each other: governance (who is responsible?), regulations (what must be done?) and operation (how is it executed and proven?). They are built in that order. Skipping the first leaves the other two without support; staying in the second produces documents that no one executes.


The forty documentary instruments distributed in three layers: governance, regulations with 22 pieces and operation with 18

This is the complete documentary body, piece by piece.

Group

Quantity

What is built

Policies · approved by the Board

12

Regulatory Compliance and Crime Prevention · AML/CFT Prevention · Code of Ethics and Conduct · Conflicts of Interest · Know Your Investor (KYI) · Know Your Business Counterparty (KYB) · Know Your Donor (KYD) · Know Your Supplier (KYS) · Alert Management and Suspicious Transaction Reporting · Whistleblower Channel and Whistleblower Protection · Document Retention and File · Training and Disclosure

Manuals · how and who applies

4

Regulatory Compliance and Crime Prevention · AML/CFT Prevention of the obligated subject · Functions of the Compliance Officer · System User Manual by profile

Methodologies · with what criteria is it measured

6

AML/CFT risk measurement by factors (5×5 scale) · Operational risk measurement · Criminal risk · Due diligence and enhanced due diligence · Segmentation and qualification of counterparties · Design and evaluation of control effectiveness

Measurement and controls

6

Catalog of risk factors · Inherent risk matrix · Inventory of controls and their evaluation · Residual risk matrix · Inherent vs. residual heat map · Risk appetite and tolerance scale

Forms · information capture

6

KYI of member or investor · KYB of company and responsible parties · KYS of donor and supplier · Sworn statement of fund origin · PEP profiling · Documentary checklist by counterparty

Records and plans · evidence

6

Format for analysis and ROS decision · Compliance Committee Minutes · Training record by person · Compliance Officer Annual Work Plan · Annual Audit Program · Electronic file by counterparty

Total

40


Two observations about this table, because this is where expensive mistakes are made:

  1. The order is not decorative. Factors, inherent, controls, residual. Reversing it produces a matrix that cannot be sustained before anyone.

  2. The conflict of interest policy is the most omitted and the most needed. In an investment network or in an association that allocates funds, the evaluator also participates. Without that policy, the rest of the program has a hole in the center.

Where does it stop being paper?: the document and its active control

This is the part that distinguishes a program that can be proven from one that can only be shown and how Snap Compliance technology helps us manage all of this. Each document in the regulatory body has a point where it becomes a control that is executed and leaves a trail, without additional manual work, and in an automated manner.


Each document and the control it becomes when operating: the risk methodology, the counterparty policy, restrictive lists, alert management and proof of supervision

Layer

Document

What it becomes within the Compliance OS (Snap Compliance)

Governance

Designation of the Officer and delimitation of powers

Profiles, permissions and segregation of duties by role, applied on each screen

Regulations

Risk assessment methodology

5×5 scale parameterized: stops being described and applies itself to each counterparty

Regulations

Counterparty knowledge policy

KYI, KYB, KYD and KYS flows configured with their mandatory checklist

Operation

Forms and documentary checklist

Digital forms that do not close if a mandatory document is missing

Operation

Restrictive lists and PEP profiling

Permanent matching against international and local lists, with the post-cessation period already counted

Operation

Risk matrix and heat map

Automatic recalculation as soon as counterparty data changes

Operation

Alert management and ROS flow

Prioritized alert, case with service clock running and complete decision file

Operation

Whistleblower channel

Anonymous and encrypted reception, with case traceability

Cross-cutting

File and proof of supervision

Unalterable record of user, date, time and action

The last row is what answers a court's or supervisor's question: how does the organization demonstrate that the control operated?. All the previous ones produce the data; that one turns it into proof.

It is worth pausing on three rows.

  • Permanent matching against lists, it must be daily!, is the only thing that covers the case of the member who changes status after having been admitted. A document cannot match anything, and an intake verification only photographs an instant.

  • The live matrix changes the nature of the instrument. What changes is not the formula—probability times impact is still probability times impact—but each band comes with its protocol already tied: a critical risk blocks the relationship and notifies the Board without waiting for someone to read the matrix next month.

  • The ROS flow carefully separates what the system automates from what a person decides. The service agreement clock and the complete decision file are supported by the platform. Whether the transaction is suspicious and whether it is reported is decided by the Compliance Officer. That is not automated, and anyone who says otherwise did not understand the regulation.

How is the Compliance Program implemented?: four phases, each with a functioning deliverable

Phase

What is delivered and verifiable

1 · Diagnosis and startup

Parameterized system, role architecture and approved permission matrix, active user catalog, restrictive list scope defined

2 · Matrices and protocols

Criminal and AML/CFT risk matrices loaded, 5×5 scale and validated thresholds, operational KYI/KYB/KYD/KYS protocols, policies and manuals presented to the Board

3 · Activation of controls

Purged historical database, permanent matching in progress, whistleblower channel open, proven traceability

4 · Governance and reporting

Training by governance role, complete ROS simulation, auditable model file, annual plans in operation

A warning we prefer to give at the beginning and not as we go: Phase 3 includes the purging of the historical database, and it is the one that usually brings findings. Someone who today appears on a list, a responsible party with a record, an empty file from three years ago. It is expected, and it is exactly the reason why it is done. Anticipating it turns a future finding into confirmation that the system works.


There is a single requirement that conditions the startup: the designation of the Compliance Officer with real mandate. It is not a formality. If that person can be removed by simple decision the day they veto an important relationship, their autonomy is nominal, and a supervisor detects it in the first interview.

What we do not promise, it is important to understand!

We prefer to say it in the first conversation and not when a discrepancy appears.

  • No program immunizes against criminal liability. The exemption is subject to proof.

  • Who evaluates the suitability of a program is a court, not a provider. No one can guarantee that result by contract.

  • Professional judgment is not automated. The decision to report a suspicious transaction is the Compliance Officer's.

What we do deliver is the other half of the problem, which is what almost no one has solved: the dated and unalterable proof that the control operated.

A provider that promises you criminal immunity is selling you something they cannot deliver

The complete documentary body

Snap Compliance provides you with the DOCUMENTARY LIBRARY with 40 instruments to start immediately, we provide you with TRAINING on how to manage these 40 instruments and we implement the TECHNOLOGY so you can manage your Compliance programs in an agile manner.


Toolkit of the Compliance Program for ASFL: forty instruments in six groups, delivered in editable formatThe forty pieces are delivered in editable format, for the physical file and for the file presented to the supervisor, and each one is connected with the control that executes it within the Compliance OS.

To get started

If you direct an ASFL, a foundation or a network that channels third-party funds, there are three questions worth answering before any other:

  1. Do you have a designated Compliance Officer with written powers, or just a de facto responsible party?

  2. If a supervisor asked you today for the complete file of a counterparty linked two years ago, could you reconstruct it?

  3. How long does it take your organization to find out that a member was included on a restrictive list?

If any of the three makes you uncomfortable, let's talk: speak with a specialist.


Informational content on the Dominican regulatory framework applicable to non-profit associations. It does not constitute legal advice. Each organization must validate the concrete application of these obligations with its legal advisor and with its Compliance Officer.

Frequently asked questions

Yes. Law 74-2025, the new Dominican Criminal Code, establishes criminal liability for legal entities—including non-profit associations—for acts committed by their administrators, directors, members, or employees in the organization's name or for its benefit. Critically, liability can arise from an omission of control or supervision alone, meaning the Board does not need to have known anything about the wrongdoing.

Three laws apply at the same time: Law 74-2025 (Criminal Code), which requires an implemented crime prevention and compliance model; Law 155-17 (AML/CFT), which mandates a risk-based prevention program, beneficial owner identification, a compliance officer, and suspicious transaction reporting; and Law 122-05 (ASFL Regime), which requires member registries, donation transparency, and audited financial statements. A single well-constructed compliance file can satisfy all three supervisors simultaneously.

An international donation activates all three frameworks simultaneously because each regulator asks a different question about the same transaction. Before CASFL and DGII, the association must prove donor transparency and fund destination. Before the UAF (Financial Analysis Unit), it must prove the legitimacy of the origin and the absence of money laundering. The accounting answer alone does not satisfy the AML/CFT question.

FATF Recommendation 8 identifies non-profit organizations as a sector vulnerable to misuse for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. The article notes that regional regulatory frameworks are moving in the same direction, making compliance obligations increasingly unavoidable for ASFLs that channel donations, international cooperation, or third-party capital.

A documentary program consists only of approved manuals and policies, which is what most organizations have. An operational program actually executes those controls and leaves a dated, auditable trail of evidence. Dominican criminal regulation requires a model that is suitable, verified, auditable, and under continuous supervision—conditions that a manual alone cannot fulfill. The criminal exemption is not declared; it must be proven with dated records showing the control was executed.

A one-time intake verification only photographs a single moment in time. A member who was clean at admission in January could be added to a restrictive list in August, and no intake review would detect that change. The article states that permanent—ideally daily—matching against international and local lists is the only mechanism that covers the case of a member who changes status after having been admitted.

The Compliance Officer holds a mandatory role with a real, written mandate and genuine autonomy; if they can be removed by simple decision the day they veto an important relationship, their autonomy is nominal and a supervisor will detect it. The decision to classify a transaction as suspicious and whether to file a Suspicious Transaction Report (ROS) is exclusively the Compliance Officer's judgment and cannot be automated. Technology supports the process by managing alerts and maintaining the decision file, but the substantive determination remains human.

The four phases are: (1) Diagnosis and startup—parameterizing the system, defining roles, permissions, and restrictive list scope; (2) Matrices and protocols—loading criminal and AML/CFT risk matrices and presenting policies to the Board; (3) Activation of controls—purging the historical database, activating permanent list matching, and opening the whistleblower channel; and (4) Governance and reporting—role-based training, a complete ROS simulation, and putting annual plans into operation. The article warns that Phase 3 typically surfaces findings such as listed individuals or incomplete historical files, which is expected and confirms the system is working.